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Abstract
We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that have sharpmulti-unit
demand. This means that each buyer i wants a specific number di of items; a bundle of size less than
di has no value. We consider the objective of setting prices and allocations in order to maximize the
total revenue of the market maker. The pricing problem with sharp multi-unit demand buyers has
a number of properties that the unit-demand model does not possess, and is an important question
in algorithmic pricing. We consider the problem of computing a revenue maximizing solution for
two solution concepts: competitive equilibrium and envy-free pricing.
For unrestricted valuations, these problems are NP-complete; we focus on a realistic special
case of “correlated values” where each buyer i has a valuation viqj for item j, where vi and qj are
positive quantities associated with buyer i and item j respectively. We present a polynomial time
algorithm to solve the revenue-maximizing competitive equilibrium problem. For envy-free pricing,
if the demand of each buyer is bounded by a constant, a revenue maximizing solution can be found
efficiently; the general demand case is shown to be NP-hard.
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1 Introduction
The problems considered in this paper are motivated by applications illustrated by the following
examples. A publisher (e.g., a TV network) has some items (such as advertising slots) that are provided
to potential customers (the advertisers). Each customer i has a demand that specifies the number of
items that i needs. Given the demand requests from different customers, as well as the values that
they are willing to pay, the problem that the publisher faces is how to allocate the items to customers
at which prices. Demand is a practical consideration and has occurred in a number of applications.
For instance, in TV (or radio) advertising [29], advertisers may request different lengths of advertising
slots for their ads programs. In banner advertising, advertisers may request different sizes or areas for
their displayed ads, which may be decomposed into a number of base units. A notable application of
our model is where advertisers choose to display their advertisement using rich media (video, audio,
animation) [4, 30] that would usually need a fixed number of positions while text ads would need only
one position each. It has been formulated as a ‘consecutive’ sharp-demand model in sponsored search
in recent works [20, 14, 13]. Hatfield [26] studies mechanisms (that do not use money) in this context:
each agent has a “quota”, a fixed number of items required, and has additive valuations for bundles
of the items. Examples of this kind of situation include allocation of (multiple) projects to employees,
items among heirs, allocating equipment time to scientists, tutorial sessions to students and players
to sports teams. Our model contrasts with [26] in that we consider mechanisms with money (market
prices arise), and our valuation functions are less general: for us, the matrix of buyer/item values has
rank 1.
We study the economic problem as a two-sided market where the supply side is composed of m
indivisible items and each item j has a parameter qj, measuring the quality of the item. For example,
in TV advertising, inventories of a commercial break are usually divided into slots of five seconds each,
and every slot has an expected number of viewers. The other side of the market has n potential buyers
where each buyer i has a demand di (the number of items that i requests) and a value vi (the benefit
to i for an item of unit quality). Thus, the valuation that i obtains from item j is given by vij = viqj.
We suppose the valuation function is also additive by standard assumption in position auction. The
viqj valuation model has been considered by Edelman et al. [15] and Varian [32] in their seminal work
for keywords advertising. We will focus on the sharp demand case, where every buyer requests exactly
di items. This scenario captures some similarity but is still quite different from single-minded buyers
(i.e., each one desires a fixed combination of items) and is distinct from the relaxed demand case, where
every buyer requests at most di items. In the practical setting of rich media advertisement, one slot
can be sold as a single text ad, or some given number of slots for one rich media ad. In practice, these
slots would normally have to be adjacent. Here we do not explicitly impose that as a requirement, but
it turns out to be satisfied by our solution, provided that slots are ordered by quality value.
Given the valuations and demands from the buyers, the market maker decides on a price vector
p = (pj) for all items and an allocation of items to buyers, as an output of the market. The question
is one of which output the market maker should choose to achieve certain objectives. In this paper,
we assume that the market maker would like to maximize his own revenue, which is defined to be
the total payment collected from the buyers. While revenue maximization is a natural goal from the
market maker’s perspective, buyers may have their own objectives as well. We aim to model a “free
market” where consumers are price takers; thus, in a robust solution concept, one has to consider the
performance of the whole market and the interests of the buyers.
Competitive equilibrium provides such a solution concept that captures both market efficiency and
fairness for the buyers. In a competitive equilibrium, every buyer obtains a best possible allocation
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that maximizes his own utility and every unallocated item is priced at zero (i.e., market clearance).
Competitive equilibrium is one of the central solution concepts in economics and has been studied and
applied in a variety of domains [28]. Combining the considerations from the two sides of the market,
an ideal solution concept therefore would be revenue maximizing competitive equilibrium.
For sharp multi-unit demand buyers, when the valuations vij are arbitrary, even determining the
existence of a competitive equilibrium is NP-complete (see Appendix A). For our correlated valuation
viqj model, we have the following results.
Theorem 1. For sharp multi-unit demand, a competitive equilibrium may not exist; even if an equi-
librium is guaranteed to exist, a maximum equilibrium (in which each price is as high as it can be in
any solution, see Definition 2.3 and Example 2.2) may not exist. Further, there is a polynomial time
algorithm that determines the existence of an equilibrium, and computes a revenue maximizing one if
it does.
While (revenue maximizing) competitive equilibrium has a number of nice economic properties and
has been recognized as an elegant tool for the analysis of competitive markets, its possible non-existence
largely ruins its applicability. Such non-existence is a result of the market clearance condition required
in the equilibrium (i.e., unallocated items have to be priced at zero). In most applications, however,
especially in advertising markets, market makers are able to manage the amount of supplies. For
instance, in TV advertising, publishers can ‘freely’ adjust the length of a commercial break. Therefore,
the market clearance condition becomes arguably unnecessary in those applications. This motivates
the study of envy-free pricing (that is, envy-free item pricing [18]) which only requires the fairness
condition in the competitive equilibrium, where no buyer can get a larger utility from any other
allocation for the given prices. In contrast with competitive equilibrium, an envy-free solution always
exists (a trivial one is obtained by setting all prices to ∞). Once again, taking the interests of both
sides of the market into account, revenue maximizing envy-free pricing is a natural solution concept
that can be applied in those marketplaces.
The study of algorithmic computation of revenue maximizing envy-free pricing was initiated by
Guruswami et al. [23], where the authors considered two special settings with unit demand buyers and
single-minded buyers and showed that a revenue maximizing envy-free pricing is NP-hard to compute.
Because envy-free pricing has applications in various settings and efficient computation is a critical
condition for its applicability, there is a surge of studies on its computational issues since the pioneering
work of [23], mainly focusing on approximation solutions and special cases that admit polynomial time
algorithms, e.g., [25, 2, 7, 3, 6, 10, 19, 16, 9, 21].
The NP-hardness result of [23] for unit demand buyers implies that we cannot hope for a polynomial
time algorithm for general vij valuations in the multi-unit demand setting, even for the very special
case when one has positive values for at most three items [9]. However, it does not rule out positive
computational results for special, but important, cases of multi-unit demand. For viqj valuations with
multi-unit demand, where the hardness reductions of [23, 9] does not apply, we have the following
results.
Theorem 2. There is a polynomial time algorithm that computes a revenue maximizing envy-free
solution in the sharp multi-unit demand model with viqj valuations if the demand of every buyer is
bounded by a constant. On the other hand, the problem is NP-hard if the sharp demand is arbitrary,
even if there are only three buyers.
For relaxed multi-unit demand, a standard technique can reduce the problem to the unit-demand
version: each buyer i with demand di can be replaced by di copies of buyer i, each of whom requests
one item. Note that under the sharp demand constraint, this trick is no longer applicable.
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We summarize our results in the following table. Here, we have a complete overview of the existence
and computation of competitive equilibrium and envy-free pricing with multi-unit demand buyers.
Most of our results are positive, suggesting that competitive equilibrium and envy-free pricing are
candidate solution concepts to be applicable in the domains where the valuations are correlated with
respect to the quality of the items.
Competitive equilibrium Envy-free pricing
Unit demand
existence yes [31] yes (trivial)
(general values vij) max revenue
computation
P [31, 12] NP-hard [23]
not always (P decidable)
Sharp multi-unit demand
existence
(NP-hard for general vij)
yes (trivial)
(vij = viqj) max revenue P (constant demand)
computation P (if one exists) NP-hard (arbitrary demand)
Table 1: Summary of previous work and our results.
Despite the recent surge in the studies of algorithmic pricing, multi-unit demand models have not
received much attention. Most previous work has focused on two simple special settings: unit demand
and single-minded buyers, but arguably multi-unit demand has much more applicability. While the
relaxed demand model shares similar properties to unit demand (e.g., existence, solution structure, and
computation), the sharp demand model has a number of features that unit demand does not possess.
• Existence of equilibrium. In unit or relaxed demand case, the competitive equilibrium always
exists, moreover, the maximum and minimum equilibrium (an equilibrium price vector no more
than any equilibrium price vector in each coordinates) always exists. As discussed above, a
competitive equilibrium may not exist in the sharp demand model. Further, even if a solution
exist, the solution space may not form a distributive lattice (Any price vector between the
minimum equilibrium price vector and maximum equilibrium price vector in each coordinate is
an equilibrium price vector).
• Over-priced items. In unit or relaxed demand, the price pj of any item j is always at most
the value vij of the corresponding winner i. This no longer holds for sharp multi-unit demand.
Specifically, even if pj > vij , buyer i may still want to get j since his net profit from other items
may compensate his loss from item j (see Example 2.3)1. This property enlarges the solution
space and adds an extra challenge to finding a revenue maximizing solution.
Our Techniques. To compute a competitive equilibrium, we first find a ‘candidate’ winner set (at
least one optimal winner set is a candidate winner set, see Definition 4.1 for details), which can be
proved to be an equilibrium winner set if a competitive equilibrium exists; then, with this set, we
transform the computation of competitive equilibria to a linear program of exponential size, which
can be solved by the ellipsoid algorithm in polynomial time. The situation becomes complicated when
1This phenomenon does occur in our real life. For example, in most travel packages offered by travel agencies, they
could lose money for some specific programs; but their overall net profit could always be positive.
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finding an optimal envy-free solution. Actually, we prove that it is NP-hard to compute an optimal
envy-free solution even if there are only three buyers. Hence, our efforts focus on the special, yet very
important bounded-demand case. To compute an optimal envy-free solution for bounded demand,
certain ‘candidate’ winner sets (the number of such sets is polynomial) are defined and found; and
crucially, there is at least one optimal winner set in our selected candidate winner sets. For each
‘candidate’ winner set, if the demand is bounded by a constant, we present a linear programming
to characterize its optimal solution when the allocation is known. Finally, a dynamic programming
algorithm is provided to find the allocation sets when a ‘candidate’ winner set is fixed. Both the linear
programming and the dynamic programming run in polynomial time.
1.1 Related Work
There are extensive studies on multi-unit demand in economics, see, e.g., [1, 17, 8]. Our study focuses
on sharp demand buyers. An alternative model is when buyers have relaxed multi-unit demand (i.e.,
one can buy a subset of at most di items), where it is well known that the set of competitive equilibrium
prices is non-empty and forms a distributive lattice [31, 22]. This immediately implies the existence
of an equilibrium with maximum possible prices; hence, revenue is maximized. Demange, Gale, and
Sotomayor [12] proposed a combinatorial dynamics which always converges to a revenue maximizing
(or minimizing) equilibrium for unit demand; their algorithm can be easily generalized to relaxed
multi-unit demand.
From an algorithmic point of view, the problem of revenue maximization in envy-free pricing
was initiated by Guruswami et al. [23], who showed that computing an optimal envy-free pricing is
APX-hard for unit-demand bidders and gave an O(log n) approximation algorithm. Briest [6] showed
that given appropriate complexity assumptions, the unit-demand envy-free pricing problem in general
cannot be approximated within O(logǫ n) for some ǫ > 0. Hartline and Yan [24] characterized optimal
envy-free pricing for unit-demand and showed its connection to mechanism design. For the multi-unit
demand setting, Chen et al. [10] gave an O(logD) approximation algorithm when there is a metric
space behind all items, where D is the maximum demand, and Briest [6] showed that the problem is
hard to approximate within a ratio of O(nǫ) for some ǫ, unless NP ⊆
⋂
ǫ>0BPTIME(2
nǫ). For the
problem of maximizing social welfare via truthful mechanisms, [27] investigates a similar sharp demand
model for combinatorial auctions in the case that bidders all have the same demand d. [27] obtains
positive algorithmic results for approximation.
Recent work by Feldman et al. [18] studies envy-free revenue maximization problem with budget but
without demand constraints and presents a 2-approximate mechanism for the envy-free pricing problem.
Another line of research is on single-minded bidders, including, for example, [23, 3, 2, 7, 11, 16]. To
the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study algorithmic computation of sharp multi-unit
demand. Most related work to this is a follow-up paper [5], where the authors prove that, based
on our work, the maximum revenue of envy-free solutions for viqj valuation with sharp multi-unit
demand cannot be approximated within a factor O(m1−ǫ) for arbitrary demands, for any ǫ > 0, unless
P = NP, and provide a simple O(m)-approximation algorithm. [5] also studies an interesting subclass
of “proper” instances and gives a tight 2-approximation algorithm for this class. Deng et al. [13]
investigates a “consecutive demand” variant in which items are arranged in a sequence and buyers
want items that are consecutive in the sequence.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Settings and Definitions
We have a market withm indivisible items,M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, where each item j has unit supply and a
parameter qj > 0, representing the quality or desirability of j. In the market, there are also n potential
buyers, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, where each buyer i has a value vi > 0, which gives the benefit that i obtains
for each unit of quality. Hence, the valuation that buyer i has for item j is vij = vi · qj . We suppose
the valuation function is also additive. In addition, each buyer i has a demand request di ∈ Z
+, which
specifies the number of items that i would like to get. We assume that di is a sharp constraint, i.e., i
gets either exactly di items
2 or nothing at all. Our model therefore defines a market with multi-unit
demand buyers and unit supply items. For any subset of buyers S ⊆ N , we use d(S) =
∑
i∈S di to
denote the total demand of items by buyers in S.
An outcome of the market is a tuple (p,X), where
• p = (p1, . . . , pm) ≥ 0 is a price vector, where pj is the price charged for item j;
• X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) is an allocation vector, where Xi is the set of items that i wins. If Xi 6= ∅, we
say i is a winner and have |Xi| = di due to the demand constraint; if Xi = ∅, i does not win any
items and we say i is a loser. Further, since every item has unit supply, we require Xi ∩Xi′ = ∅
for any i 6= i′.
• If j ∈ Xi, we use i = b(j) to represent the buyer of j ∈M .
Given an output (p,X), let ui(p,X) denote the utility of i. That is, if Xi 6= ∅, then ui(p,X) =∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj); if Xi = ∅, then ui(p,X) = 0.
Definition 2.1 (Envy-freeness). We say a tuple (p,X) is an envy-free solution if every buyer is
envy-free, where a buyer i is envy-free if the following conditions are satisfied:
• if Xi 6= ∅, then (i) ui(p,X) ≥ 0, and (ii) for any other subset of items T with |T | = di,
ui(p,X) ≥
∑
j∈T
(vij − pj);
• if Xi = ∅ (i.e., i wins nothing), then, for any subset of items T with |T | = di,
∑
j∈T
(vij − pj) ≤ 0.
Envy-freeness captures fairness in the market — the utility of everyone is maximized at the corre-
sponding allocation for the given prices. That is, if i wins a subset Xi, then i cannot obtain a higher
utility from any other subset of the same size; if i does not win anything, then i cannot obtain a
positive utility from any subset with size di. It is easy to see that an envy-free solution always exists
(e.g., set all prices to be ∞ and allocate nothing to every buyer).
Another solution concept we will consider is competitive equilibrium, which requires that, besides
envy-freeness, every unsold item must be priced at zero (or at any given reserve price). Such market
clearance condition captures efficiency of the whole market. The formal definition is given below.
Definition 2.2 (Competitive equilibrium). We say a tuple (p,X) is a competitive equilibrium if it is
envy-free, and for each item j, pj = 0 if no-one wins j in the allocation X.
2By the nature of the solution concepts considered in the paper, it can be assumed without loss of generality that i
will not get more than di items.
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For a given output (p,X), the revenue collected by the market maker is defined as
∑n
i=1
∑
j∈Xi
pj.
Note that by the definition of competitive equilibrium, the revenue collected from a competitive equi-
librium is
∑m
i=1 pj. We are interested in revenue maximizing solutions, specifically, revenue maximizing
competitive equilibrium (if one exists) and revenue maximizing envy-free pricing. The main objective
of the paper is algorithmic computations of these two optimization problems.
To simplify the following discussions, we sort all buyers and items in non-increasing order of their
unit values and qualities, respectively, i.e., v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn and q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qm. Let K be the
number of distinct values in the set {v1, . . . , vn}. Let A1, . . . , AK be a partition of all buyers where
each Ak, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, contains the set of buyers that have the kth largest value.
2.2 Examples
It is well known that a competitive equilibrium always exists for unit demand buyers (even for general
vij valuations) [31]; for our sharp multi-unit demand model, however, a competitive equilibrium may
not exist, as the following example shows.
Example 2.1 (Competitive equilibrium need not exist). There are two buyers i1, i2 with values vi1 = 10
and vi2 = 9, and demands di1 = 1 and di2 = 2, respectively, and two items j1, j2 with unit quality
qj1 = qj2 = 1. If i1 wins an item, without loss of generality, say j1, then j2 is unsold and pj2 = 0; by
envy-freeness of i1, we have pj1 = 0. Thus, i2 envies the bundle {j1, j2}. If i2 wins both items, then
pj1 + pj2 ≤ vi2j1 + vi2j2 = 18, implying that pj1 ≤ 9 or pj2 ≤ 9; thus, i1 is not envy-free. Hence, there
is no competitive equilibrium in the given instance.
In the unit demand case, it is well-known that the set of equilibrium prices forms a distributive
lattice; hence, there exist extremes which correspond to the maximum and the minimum equilibrium
price vectors. In our multi-unit demand model, however, even if a competitive equilibrium exists,
maximum equilibrium prices may not exist.
Definition 2.3 (Maximum Equilibrium). A price vector p is called a maximum equilibrium price
vector if for any other equilibrium price vector q, pj ≥ qj for every item j. An equilibrium (p,X) is
called a relaxed maximum equilibrium if p is a maximum price vector.
Example 2.2 (Maximum equilibrium need not exist). There are two buyers i1, i2 with values vi1 =
10, vi2 = 1 and demands di1 = 2, di2 = 1, and two items j1, j2 with unit quality qj1 = qj2 = 1. It
can be seen that allocating the two items to i1 at prices (19, 1) or (1, 19) are both revenue maximizing
equilibria; but there is no equilibrium price vector which is at least both (19, 1) and (1, 19).
2.3 Over-Priced Items
Because of the sharp multi-unit demand, an interesting and important property is that it is possible
that some items are ‘over-priced’; this is a significant difference between sharp multi-unit and unit
demand models. Formally, in a solution (p,X), we say an item j is over-priced if there is a buyer i
such that j ∈ Xi and pj > viqj . That is, the price charged for item j is larger than its contribution to
the utility of its winner.
Example 2.3 (Over-priced items in a revenue maximizing solution). There are two buyers i1, i2 with
values vi1 = 20, vi2 = 10 and demands di1 = 1 and di2 = 2, and three items j1, j2, j3 with qualities
qj1 = 3, qj2 = 2, qj3 = 1. We can see that the allocations Xi1 = {j1},Xi2 = {j2, j3} and prices (45, 25, 5)
constitute a revenue maximizing envy-free solution with total revenue 75, where item j2 is over-priced.
If no items are over-priced, the maximum possible prices are (40, 20, 10) with total revenue 70.
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We have the following characterization for over-priced items in an equilibrium solution.
Lemma 2.1. For any given competitive equilibrium (p,X), the following claims hold:
• If there is any unallocated item, then there are no over-priced items.
• At most one winner can have over-priced items; further, that winner, say i, must be the one with
the smallest value among all winners in the equilibrium (p,X). That is, for any other winner
i′ 6= i, we have vi′ > vi.
Proof. The first claim is obvious since any unallocated item j′ is priced at 0; thus if there is a winner
i and item j ∈ Xi such that pj > viqj, then i would envy the subset Xi ∪ {j
′} \ {j}.
To prove the second claim, suppose there are two winners i, i′ where vi ≥ vi′ , and suppose that i
has over-priced item j. Since i′ is envy-free, his own utility must be non-negative; we know there is
an item j′ ∈ Xi′ such that vi′qj′ ≥ pj′. This implies that viqj′ ≥ pj′; thus, i would envy the subset
Xi ∪ {j
′} \ {j}, a contradiction.
2.4 Properties
We present some observations regarding envy-freeness and competitive equilibrium. Our first observa-
tion implies that a winner is envy-free if and only if he prefers each of his allocated items to any other
item.
Lemma 2.2. Given any solution (p,X) and any winner i, if i is envy-free then vij − pj ≥ vij′ − pj′
for any items j ∈ Xi and j
′ /∈ Xi. On the other hand, if i is not envy-free, then there is j ∈ Xi and
j′ /∈ Xi such that vij − pj < vij′ − pj′.
Proof. If i is envy-free but (for j ∈ Xi and j
′ /∈ Xi) vij − pj < vij′ − pj′ , it is easy to see that i would
envy subset Xi∪{j
′}\{j}, a contradiction. If i is not envy-free, then there is a subset T of items with
|T | = di such that
∑
j∈Xi
(vij − pj) <
∑
j′∈T (vij′ − pj′). Since |Xi| = |T |, the inequality holds for at
least one item, i.e., there is j ∈ Xi and j
′ /∈ Xi such that vij − pj < vij′ − pj′.
Lemma 2.3. For any envy-free solution (p,X), suppose there are two buyers i, i′ with values vi > vi′
and two items j and j′ that are allocated to i and i′ respectively, i.e., j ∈ Xi and j
′ ∈ Xi′ . Then
qj ≥ qj′.
Proof. By the above Lemma 2.2, we have
viqj − pj ≥ viqj′ − pj′
vi′qj′ − pj′ ≥ vi′qj − pj
Adding the two inequalities together, we get (vi − vi′)(qj − qj′) ≥ 0, yielding the desired result.
Lemma 2.3 implies that in any envy-free solution, the allocation of items is monotone in terms of
their amount of qualities and the values of the winners, i.e., winners with larger values win items with
larger qualities. However, it does not imply that the value of every winner is larger than or equal to
the value of any loser. For instance, consider three buyers i1, i2, i3 and two items j1, j2 with qj1 = 2
and qj2 = 1. The values and demands are vi1 = 1.3, vi2 = 1, vi3 = 0.9 and di1 = 1, di2 = 2, di3 = 1.
Then prices pj1 = 2.2, pj2 = 0.9 and allocations Xi1 = {j1},Xi2 = ∅,Xi3 = {j2} constitute a revenue
maximizing envy-free solution. In this solution, vi2 > vi3 , but i2 does not win any item (because of
the sharp demand constraint) whereas i3 wins item j2.
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Lemma 2.4. If there is a competitive equilibrium (p,X), then for any winner i, item j ∈ Xi and
unallocated item j′, we have qj ≥ qj′.
Proof. Since item j′ is not allocated to any buyer, its price pj′ = 0. By envy-freeness and Lemma 2.2,
we have viqj ≥ viqj − pj ≥ viqj′ − pj′ = viqj′, which implies that qj ≥ qj′.
By the above characterization, in any competitive equilibrium, all allocated items have larger
qualities. Hence, by Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4, we know that if the set of winners is fixed in a competitive
equilibrium, the allocation is determined implicitly as well. On the other hand, we observe that
Lemma 2.4 does not hold if (p,X) is an (revenue maximizing) envy-free solution. For instance, consider
two buyers i1, i2 with values vi1 = 10, vi2 = 1 and demand di1 = 1, di2 = 10, and twelve items
j1, j2, . . . , j12 with qualities qj1 = 10, qj2 = 5, qj3 = · · · = qj12 = 1. It can be seen that in the
optimal envy-free solution, we set prices pj1 = 91, pj2 = ∞, pj3 = · · · = pj12 = 1, and allocate
Xi1 = {j1},Xi2 = {j3, . . . , j12}, which generates total revenue 91 + 10 = 101. In this solution,
qj2 > qj3 = · · · = qj12 , but item j2 is not allocated to any buyer.
Lemma 2.5. Given an envy-free solution (p,X), a loser ℓ and any subset T of dℓ items, the following
property cannot hold:
A non-empty subset of items in T are either allocated to winners with values smaller than vℓ or priced
at 0; any other elements of T are allocated to winners having the same value vℓ as ℓ.
Note that this is a result about envy-free prices, not just competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Let (p,X) be an envy-free pair of price and allocation vectors. Given the loser ℓ and T satisfying
the conditions of the statement of the Lemma, we show how to construct a set T ′ of items that ℓ envies.
Let T = T0 ∪ T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ts be a partition of T where T0 consists of items priced at 0 in (p,X) and
for i > 0, Ti = T ∩Xi and s is the number of non-empty elements in {T ∩Xi, i ∈ [n]}. Note that any
non-empty Ti satisfies vi ≤ vℓ, and if T0 = ∅ then Ti 6= ∅ for some i > 0 with vi < vℓ.
Note that T0 satisfies
∑
j∈T0
viqj − pj ≥ 0, where the inequality is strict if T0 is non-empty. Let
T ′0 = T0.
Consider any non-empty Ti (with i > 0). Let T
′
i be the |Ti| items j ∈ Xi that maximize viqj − pj.
We have
∑
j∈T ′i
viqj − pj ≥ 0. Hence
∑
j∈T ′i
vℓqj − pj ≥ 0, with strict inequality if vi < vℓ.
Summing these inequalities, we have
∑s
i=0
∑
j∈T ′i
vℓqj − pj ≥ 0, and in fact the inequality is strict
since at least one of the s+ 1 inequalities is strict. Let T ′ = T ′0 ∪ T
′
1 ∪ · · · ∪ T
′
s; |T
′| = |T | = dℓ and we
have shown that ℓ envies T ′.
3 Computation of Competitive Equilibrium
Our main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 3.1. There is a polynomial algorithm to determine the existence of a competitive equilibrium;
and if one exists, it computes a revenue maximizing equilibrium.
Thus, both the existence problem and the maximization problem become tractable, as a result of
the correlated valuations vij = viqj.
The algorithm, called Max-CE, is divided into two steps. The first step is to compute a set of
‘candidate’ winners if an equilibrium exists. The second step is to calculate a ‘candidate’ equilibrium
and verify if it is indeed a (revenue maximizing) equilibrium. Recall that Ak, 1 ≤ k ≤ K denotes all
the buyers with the kth largest value.
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Max-CE stage 1.
1. Let S∗ ← ∅ be the set of candidate winners
2. Let k ← 1 and let D ← m be the number of ‘‘available items’’
3. While k ≤ K
• If di > D for every i ∈ Ak, let k ← k + 1
• Else
– Let S = {i | i ∈ Ak, di ≤ D}
– If d(S) > D
(a) If there is S′ ⊆ S s.t. d(S′) = D
let S∗ ← S∗ ∪ S′, and goto Max-CE stage 2
(b) Else, a competitive equilibrium does not exist, and
return
– Else d(S) ≤ D
(c) Let S∗ ← S∗ ∪ S, D ← D −
∑
i∈S di, k ← k + 1
4. Goto Max-CE stage 2
Note that in the above step 3(a) we check whether there is S′ ⊆ S such that d(S′) = D; this is
equivalent to solving a subset sum problem. However, in our instance, each demand satisfies di ≤ m.
Hence, a dynamic programming approach can solve the problem in time O(n2m). Hence, stage 1
runs in strongly polynomial time.
An input to Max-CE is all the n buyers with valuation vi and demand di and all the m items with
qualities qj.
Lemma 3.1. If an input to Max-CE has a competitive equilibrium (p,X), then stage 1 will not
return that an equilibrium does not exist at step 3(b).
Proof. Let (p,X) be a competitive equilibrium of an input to Max-CE. In this proof, when we refer to
winning/losing buyers, or allocated/unallocated items, we mean with respect to (p,X). In particular,
let W be the set of winners of (p,X).
Suppose that Max-CE stage 1 exits on the k-th iteration of the loop. We claim that during
the first k − 1 iterations, all buyers added to S∗ must be winners i.e. S∗ ⊂ W . To see this, suppose
alternatively that at iteration k′ < k, buyer ℓ is the first loser to be added to S∗. In that case, ℓ
has dℓ items that satisfy the conditions of Lemma 2.5, contradicting envy-freeness (Suppose that the
winners found by the algorithm during the first k′−1 iterations are given their allocation in (p,X). At
iteration k′, the algorithm has more than dℓ available items, some of which are allocated to buyers with
value less than ℓ, or are unallocated.). Second, we claim that S∗ =W ∩ (∪k−1i=1Ai). We will inductively
shows that W ∩ (∪k−1i=1Ai) ⊂ S
∗. The base case k = 2, since step 3(c) is executed during the first k− 1
iterations, each i ∈ A1 with di ≤ m will be added to S
∗, which gives that W ∩A1 ⊂ S
∗. Suppose now
k − 2 is true, we argue that the case k − 1 is true. Since step 3(c) is executed during the first k − 1
iterations, each buyer i ∈ Ak−1 with di ≤ D will be added to S
∗. This is the maximum number of
buyers in Ak−1 which can be added into W . Therefore, W ∩ (∪
k−1
i=1Ai) ⊂ S
∗. Since S∗ ⊂W ∩ (∪k−1i=1Ai),
the claim S∗ =W ∩ (∪k−1i=1Ai) holds.
At the final iteration k we must have S 6= ∅ (otherwise the algorithm will begin a new iteration).
Since d(S) > D, we have S\W 6= ∅ (members of S have too much demand for them all to be able to
win). Since there is no subset S′ ⊆ S such that d(S′) = D, we have d(S ∩W ) < D. Hence, there
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are items that are not allocated to buyers in S∗ ∪ (S ∩W ). Note that these items are either priced
0 or allocated to winners with values smaller than vk. Since S
∗ = W ∩ (∪k−1i=1Ai), there are D items
allocated to winners with values no more than vk or priced 0, among which there are items either
priced 0 or allocated to winners with values smaller than vk. Hence, for any loser i
′ ∈ S \W where
di′ < D, we can find di′ items that satisfy the condition of Lemma 2.5: a contradiction.
Lemma 3.2. A revenue maximizing competitive equilibrium (p,X) can be converted to one with equal
revenue whose winning set is S∗.
Proof. Assume that the given instance has a competitive equilibrium (p,X) and that Max-CE enters
Max-CE stage 2 at the kth iteration with the set of candidates S∗. Let W be the set of winners of
(p,X), and let W ′ =W ∩ (A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak−1) and W
′′ =W \W ′. Let S1 = S∗ ∩ (A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak−1) and
S2 = S∗\S1 (note that S2 ⊆ Ak). From the analysis of the above lemma and Lemma 2.5, we know that
(i)W ′ = S1, (ii)W ′′ ⊆ Ak, and (iii) d(W
′′) = d(S2). (i) is proved in Lemma 2.5. For (ii), ifW ′′\Ak 6= ∅,
thenW ′′∩Ak will be selected byMax-CE andMax-CE in stage 1 will enter k
′th iteration with k′ > k,
which contradicts that k is the final iteration in stage 1 of Max-CE . Hence, W ′′ ⊂ Ak. For (iii), in
kth iteration of stage 1, if Max-CE enters step 3(a), then d(S2) = m− d(S1) = m− d(W ′) ≥ d(W ′′).
Suppose d(S2) > d(W ′′), which means that some buyer in S2 will be a loser in (p,X). Due to (ii), in
(p,X), there are m− d(W ) items priced 0 and d(W ′′) items allocated to W ′′. Hence, the loser in S2
of (p,X) will not be envy-free by Lemma 2.5, a contradiction. If in kth iteration of stage 1, Max-CE
enters step 3(c), then S2 will be winners by previous argument and we have d(W ′′) = d(S2). Thus, the
only difference between S∗ and W lies in the selection of buyers in Ak (this is due to possibly multiple
choices in step 3(a) in Max-CE stage 1). Due to envy-freeness, we have∑
i∈W ′′\S2
ui(p,X) =
∑
i∈W ′′\S2
∑
j∈Xi
(viqj − pj) ≥ 0 ≥
∑
i∈S2\W ′′
ui(p,X)
Since all buyers in W ′′ \S2 and S2 \W ′′ have the same value, we know that the above inequalities are
tight. Thus, if we reassign the items in ∪i∈W ′′Xi to the buyers in S
2 and keep the same prices, the
resulting output will still be an equilibrium.
Given the above characterization, the second step of the algorithm Max-CE is described in Max-
CE stage 2. In the LP of Max-CE stage 2, there are m variables where each item j has a variable
p∗j . The first two constraints ensure that the price vector is a set of feasible market clearing prices.
The third condition guarantees that all winners are envy-free. The last condition says that for each
loser i and any subset of items T with T = |di|, i cannot obtain a positive utility from T . Notice that
it is possible that there are exponentially many combinations of T ; thus the LP has an exponential
number of constraints. However, observe that for any given solution p∗, it is easy to verify if p∗ is a
feasible solution of the LP or find a violated constraint. In particular, for every loser i, we can order
all items j in decreasing order of viqj − p
∗
j and verify the subset T composed of the first di items; if
i cannot obtain a positive utility from such T , then i is envy-free. Therefore, there is a separation
oracle to the LP, and thus, the ellipsoid method can solve the LP in polynomial time. Hence, the total
running time of Max-CE is polynomial.
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Max-CE stage 2.
5. Allocation X∗ is constructed as follows:
• Let X∗i ← ∅, for each buyer i /∈ S
∗
• For each i ∈ S∗ in non-increasing order of vi
– allocate di of the remaining items to i in non-increasing order of qj
6. Price p∗ is computed according to the following linear program:
max
∑
i∈S∗
∑
j∈X∗
i
p∗j
s.t. p∗j ≥ 0 ∀ j
p∗j = 0 ∀ j /∈ ∪i∈S∗X
∗
i
viqj − p∗j ≥ viqj′ − p
∗
j′ ∀ i ∈ S
∗, j ∈ X∗i , j
′ /∈ X∗i∑
j∈T (viqj − p
∗
j ) ≤ 0 ∀ i /∈ S
∗, T with |T | = di
7. If the above linear program has a feasible solution, output the tuple (p∗,X∗)
8. Else, return that a competitive equilibrium does not exist
If the algorithm returns a tuple (p∗,X∗), certainly it is a competitive equilibrium; further, it is a
revenue maximizing equilibrium because of the objective function in the LP. It is therefore sufficient
to show the following claim to complete the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 3.3. If there exists a competitive equilibrium, then stage 2 will not claim that an equilibrium
does not exist at step 8.
Proof. If there is a competitive equilibrium (p,X), let W be the set of winners of the equilibrium. By
Lemma 3.1, we know that Max-CE will enter Max-CE stage 2. By the above discussions, we know
thatW and S∗ only differ in the last kth iteration of the main loop of Max-CE stage 1 and replacing
all winners in W ∩Ak with S
∗ ∩Ak gives an equilibrium as well. Further, by Lemma 2.3 and 2.4, the
allocation of items to the winners in W is fixed. Hence, the equilibrium price vector p gives a feasible
solution to the LP in the stage 2, which implies that the algorithm will not claim that an equilibrium
does not exist.
4 Computation of Envy-Free Pricing
In this section, we will ignore the market clearance condition (i.e. that unsold items are priced at 0)
and only consider envy-freeness. We noted earlier that an envy-free solution always exists. Our main
results are the following.
Theorem 4.1. For the sharp multi-unit demand with viqj valuations, it is NP-hard to solve the
revenue-maximizing envy-free pricing problem, even if there are only three buyers. However, if the
demand of each buyer is bounded by a constant, then the revenue-maximizing envy-free pricing problem
can be solved in polynomial time.
We note that the correlated viqj valuations are crucial to derive an efficient computation when the
demands are bounded by a constant; in contrast, for unit-demand, the envy-free pricing is NP-hard
for general valuations vij even if every buyer is interested in at most three items [9].
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4.1 Algorithm for Constant Demands
Throughout this subsection, let ∆ be a constant where di ≤ ∆ for any buyer i, and again, buyers
and items are sorted according to their values and qualities. For any tuple (p,X), we assume that
all unsold items are priced at ∞. This assumption is without loss of generality for envy-freeness. We
will first explore some important properties of an (optimal) envy-free solution, then at the end of the
section present our algorithm.
4.1.1 Candidate Winner Sets
For a given set S of buyers, let max(S) and min(S) denote the buyer in S that has the largest and
smallest index, respectively.
Definition 4.1 (Candidate winner set). Given a subset of buyers S 6= ∅, let k = max{r|Ar ∩ S 6= ∅}.
We say S is a candidate winner set if the total demand of buyers in S is at most m, i.e., d(S) ≤ m,
and for any i ∈ A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak−1 \ S, di >
∑
i′∈S: i′>i
di′ .
The definition of candidate winner set is closely related to envy-freeness. Indeed, due to Lemma 2.5,
the above definition defines a slightly larger set (than all possible sets of winners in envy-free solutions)
as the inequality does not consider all the buyers completely in the same value category vj. However,
this definition makes it easier for us to describe and analyze the algorithm.
Proposition 4.1. For any envy-free solution (p,X), let S = {i | Xi 6= ∅} be the set of winners. Then
S is either a candidate winner set or S = ∅.
Proof. The claim follows directly from Lemma 2.5.
By Proposition 4.1, in order to calculate the optimal envy-free solutions, we need only to com-
pute the envy-free solutions whose winner sets are candidate winner sets. Therefore, Algorithm
FindWinners(S) is a procedure for finding candidate winner sets based on Lemma 2.5 and Proposi-
tion 4.1. It is an inductive procedure where the buyer with larger value must be selected as a winner
if his demand is no more than the total demands of all the winners with smaller values (otherwise by
Lemma 2.5, this buyer will be a loser and not be envy-free if he is not selected).
FindWinners(S): Input a set of buyers S
• Let imax = max(S) and assume imax ∈ Ak
• Initially let WS = S
• For each buyer j ∈ A1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ak−1 in reverse order
– If j /∈ S and dj ≤
∑
i∈WS : i>j
di, let WS ←WS ∪ {j}
• Return WS
Proposition 4.2. For any subset of buyers S, let WS =FindWinners(S).
• If d(WS) ≤ m, then WS is a candidate winner set and for any candidate winner set S
′ ⊇ S,
WS ⊆ S
′.
• If d(WS) > m, then there is no candidate winner set containing S.
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Proof. Obviously, if d(WS) ≤ m, then from the definition of candidate winner set, we know WS is a
candidate winner set. Still, by the definition of candidate winner set, for any j inWS\S, any candidate
winner set S′ ⊇ S, since dj ≤
∑
i∈WS : i>j
di, then dj ≤
∑
i∈S′: i>j
di (since S
′ ⊇ S), thus, j ∈ S′, hence,
WS ⊆ S
′. Therefore, the second statement follows.
Similar to FindWinners(S), FindLoser(S) is also an inductive procedure based on the observa-
tion that if a loser is envy-free then a loser with the same valuation but with a larger demand will also
be envy-free. For more details, see the proof of Proposition 4.3.
FindLoser(S): Input a candidate winner set S
• Let imin = min(S) and assume imin ∈ Aj
• Initially let LS = ∅, and α =∞
• For each k = j, j + 1, . . . ,K
– Let i0 = argmin{di | i ∈ Ak\ S}
– If di0 < α, let LS ← LS ∪ {i0} and α← di0
• Return LS
Proposition 4.3. For any given tuple (p,X) with winner set S, suppose that S is a candidate winner
set and let LS =FindLoser(S). If all losers in LS are envy-free with respect to (p,X), then all other
losers are envy-free as well.
Proof. Assume there exists a loser i′ who is not envy-free, that is, such that there exists a set T ′ of di′
items such that
∑
j∈T ′(vi′qj − pj) > 0. This implies that there exists T ⊆ T
′ with |T | = di such that∑
j∈T (viqj − pj) ≥
∑
j∈T (vi′qj − pj) > 0: a contradiction.
Hence, by the rules of FindLoser, we know that if all the losers in LS are envy-free, all other
losers in Aj ∪ · · · ∪AK are envy-free as well. On the other hand, for any loser j ∈ A1∪ · · · ∪Aj−1, since
S is a candidate winner set, we know that dj >
∑
i∈S: i>j
di = d(S). Since all unsold items are priced at
∞, we know that j is envy-free. Hence, all losers are envy-free.
4.1.2 Bounding the Number of Candidate Winner Sets
We have the following bound on the number of candidate winner sets.
Lemma 4.1. For any k ∈ {2, . . . ,K} and S ⊆ Ak, suppose d(S) ≤ m. Let
C =
{
S ∪ S′ | S′ ⊆ A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak−1 and S ∪ S
′ is a candidate winner set
}
Then |C| ≤
⌊
m
d(S)
⌋
.
Proof. Let a = d(S) and ℓ be the index of the buyer max(Ak−1). We add buyers ℓ, ℓ− 1, ℓ − 2, . . . , 1
into S in sequence and maintain all the possible candidate winner sets. Let C0 = {S}. In general, we
have constructed Ct containing all the candidate winner sets of {ℓ, ℓ− 1, ℓ− 2, . . . , ℓ− t+ 1} ∪ S. We
order Ct = {St,1, St,2, . . . , St,nt} such that d(St,1) ≤ d(St,2) ≤ · · · ≤ d(St,nt) ≤ m. We will inductively
prove that d(St,i) ≥ id(S), for t = 0, 1, · · · , ℓ.
The base case t = 0 is trivial since C0 = {S}. Suppose the claim holds for some other value of t.
That is, we have constructed Ct containing all the candidate winner sets of {ℓ, ℓ−1, ℓ−2, . . . , ℓ−t+1}∪S
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with d(St,i) ≥ id(S), for any i ≤ nt. Now for the case t + 1, which means we will add ℓ − t into Ct
to construct Ct+1. Let ts = max{i : d(St,i) < dℓ−t} if {i : d(St,i) < dℓ−t} 6= ∅, otherwise ts = 0. Let
St+1,j = St,j for j = 1, 2, · · · , ts, St+1,j+ts = St,j ∪ {ℓ− t} for j = 1, 2, . . . , nt. Clearly d(St+1,i) ≥ id(S)
for i ≤ ts by the inductive hypothesis. Also,
d(St+1,j+ts) = d(St,j) + dℓ−t ≥ jd(S) + d(St,ts) ≥ (j + ts)d(S).
Let nt+1 = max{i : d(St+1,i) ≤ m}. Clearly the claim follows for the case t+ 1.
The lemma follows by the condition m ≥ d(Sℓ,nℓ) ≥ nℓd(S).
4.1.3 Optimal Winner Sets
Definition 4.2 (Optimal winner set). A subset of buyers S is called an optimal winner set if there is
a revenue maximizing envy-free solution (p,X) such that S is its set of winners.
Proposition 4.4. Let S be an optimal winner set and let k = max{r | Ar ∩S 6= ∅}. For any S
′ ⊆ Ak,
if d(S′) = d(S ∩Ak), then S
′ ∪ (S\Ak) is an optimal winner set as well.
Before proving the proposition, we first establish the following claim.
Claim 4.1. Let (p,X) be a revenue-maximizing envy-free solution and let S be the winning set in
(p,X), and let k = max{r | Ar ∩ S 6= ∅}. Then every buyer in Ak has utility zero.
Proof. Of course, every loser in Ak has utility zero. To show that every winner in Ak has utility zero,
we show that if there exists a winner who has positive utility, then prices can be raised to the point
where his utility becomes zero, while maintaining envy-freeness (contradicting the assumption that
(p,X) maximizes revenue).
Let imax be the buyer in Ak ∩ S with the highest utility. Let
δ =
uimax(p,X)
dimax
.
We claim that (p+ δ,X) is an envy-free solution as well, where the price of each item is increased by
δ.
Obviously we have δ ≥ 0, and the conclusion holds trivially if δ = 0. Suppose δ > 0. For the tuple
(p+ δ,X), since all items have their prices increased by the same amount, all losers are still envy-free
and all winners would not envy the items they don’t get. Hence, we need only to check that each
winner still gets a non-negative utility. For imax, we have uimax(p + δ,X) = 0. For any other winner
i 6= imax, it holds that vi ≥ vimax . Since i does not envy any item in (p,X), for any item j
′ ∈ Xi and
j ∈ Ximax , it holds that viqj′ − pj′ ≥ viqj − pj, hence, pj′ ≤ vi(qj′ − qj) + pj. Then, we get
pj′ ≤
∑
j∈Ximax
(vi(qj′ − qj) + pj)
dimax
= viqj′ −
∑
j∈Ximax
(viqj − pj)
dimax
.
This implies that
pj′ + δ ≤ viqj′.
Hence, ui(p+ δ,X) =
∑
j′∈Xi
(viqj′ − pj′ − δ) ≥ 0. Therefore, (p+ δ,X) is an envy-free solution.
We are now ready for the proof of Proposition 4.4.
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Proof of Proposition 4.4. Since S is an optimal winner set, there is an optimal envy-free solution (p,X)
such that S = {i | Xi 6= ∅}. We construct a new allocation X
′ with winner set S′ ∪ (S\Ak) as follows:
• For any i /∈ Ak, X
′
i = Xi.
• For any i ∈ Ak \ S
′, X ′i = ∅.
• For all the buyers in S′, allocate items in
⋃
i∈S∩Ak
Xi to them arbitrarily. (The allocation is
feasible as d(S′) = d(S ∩Ak).)
Obviously, (p,X′) generates the same revenue as (p,X). We claim that (p,X′) is an envy-free solution
(this implies our desired result that S′ ∪ (S\Ak) is an optimal winner set). For any buyer i /∈ Ak, since
prices are not changed, i is still envy-free.
Next we prove that all buyers i ∈ Ak are envy-free in (p,X
′). Let J = ∪i∈S∩AkXi be the set of
items allocated to buyers in Ak; we also have J = ∪i∈S′X
′
i. Suppose first that |S ∩ Ak| = |S
′| = 1; in
this case (p,X) differs trivially from (p,X′), so (p,X′) is envy-free.
Alternatively, there is some buyer i¯ ∈ Ak with di¯ < d(S ∩ Ak). We show that any item j ∈ J
allocated to any buyer i ∈ Ak in (p,X
′), affords zero utility to i, i.e. j satisfies viqj = pj. Let v be
the value shared by all i ∈ Ak, i.e. v = vi for any i ∈ Ak. Since (p,X) is envy-free, we have using
Claim 4.1 that ui(p,X) = 0 for all i ∈ Ak, hence
∑
j∈J vqj − pj = 0. Suppose some j ∈ J does not
satisfy vqj − pj = 0. Arrange all j ∈ J in descending order of vqj − pj . Any proper prefix P of this
sequence satisfies
∑
j∈P vqj − pj > 0. Then buyer i¯ envies this prefix.
4.1.4 Maximizing Revenue for a Given Set of Winners and Allocated Items
Suppose that S is a candidate winner set and T is a subset of items, where |T | = d(S). We want to
know if there is an envy-free solution such that S is the set of winners and S wins items in T ; if yes,
we want to find one that maximizes revenue. This problem can be solved easily by a linear program
with an exponential number of constraints for each i ∈ S. The following combinatorial algorithm does
the same thing; the idea inside is critical to our main algorithm.
We will use the following notations: S = {i1, i2, . . . , it} with i1 < i2 < · · · < it and T =
{j1, j2, . . . , jℓ} with j1 < j2 < · · · < jℓ. Let ib(s) be the winner of js, s = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ.
Remark 4.1. It should be noted that in LP (k), the objective function is equivalent to maximize pk. Also
note that di = O(1) for constraint (5) of MaxRevenue, for any i ∈ [n]. By the pricing rule (2),(6)
and (c) of MaxRevenue(S, T ), the total revenue
∑
j∈T pj obtained is a linear increasing function of
pk, hence maximizing pk is equivalent to maximizing the total revenue. This remark will be used later
in the proof of Lemma 4.2.
We establish the following properties:
Proposition 4.5. Let (p,X) be computed in terms of LP(k
∗) where k∗ ∈ Xit in MaxRevenue(S, T ).
Let ib(u) be the winner of ju. Use the convention jℓ−dit+1 = k
∗. For s = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ− dit, we have
1. vib(s)qjs+1 − pjs+1 ≥ 0;
2.
pjs
qjs
≥
pjs+1
qjs+1
;
3. pji ≥ pji+1.
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MaxRevenue(S, T ): Input a candidate winner set S and a subset of items T where
|T | = d(S)
• Let LS = FindLoser(S).
• Allocation X
– Let Xi ← ∅, for each buyer i /∈ S.
– Allocate items in T to buyers in S according to the following rule (by
Lemma 2.3):
Buyers with smaller indices obtain items with smaller indices.
• Price p
– Let Y = ∅
– For each item j /∈ T, let pj =∞.
– For each item k ∈ Xit, do the following
(a) Let J be the last 2∆ items with the largest indices in T if |T | > 2∆
and J = T otherwise. Run the following linear program (denoted by
LP(k)), which computes prices for items in Xit−1 ∪Xit
min vit−1qk − pk
s.t. vit−1qk − pk ≥ vit−1qj − pj ∀ j ∈ Xit (1)∑
j∈Xit
(vitqj − pj) = 0 (2)
vit−1qj − pj = vit−1qk − pk ∀ j ∈ Xit−1 (3)
vitqj − pj ≤ vitqj′ − pj′ ∀ j ∈ Xit−1 , j
′ ∈ Xit (4)∑
j∈J′ (viqj − pj) ≤ 0 ∀ i ∈ LS, J
′ ⊆ J with |J ′| = di (5)
pjs = vb(s)(qjs − qjs+1) + pjs+1 ∀js ∈ J −Xit −Xit−1 (6)
(b) If the LP(k) in (a) has a feasible solution, let Y ← Y ∪ {k}.
(c) For each item js ∈ Xi1 ∪ · · · ∪Xit−2 in the reverse order
∗ let pjs = vib(s)(qjs − qjs+1) + pjs+1
(d) Denote the price vector computed above by p(k).
• If Y = ∅, return that there is no price vector p such that (p,X) is envy-free.
• Otherwise,
– Let k∗ ∈ Y have the largest total revenue for which (p(k
∗),X) is an envy-free
solution.
– Output the tuple (p(k
∗),X) .
Proof. For the first inequality, consider the last case, vit−1qk∗ − pk∗ ≥ 0. Assume it does not hold. By
(1) in Algorithm MaxRevenue,
∑
j∈Xit
(vit−1qj − pj) < 0. Therefore,
∑
j∈Xit
(vitqj − pj) < 0, which
contradicts Formula (2). Further, viuqk∗ − pk∗ ≥ 0 for all u : 1 ≤ u ≤ t− 1. That is, all other buyers
have nonnegative utility on item k∗. Now consider s = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ−dit. By (6) and (c) in the algorithm,
using the convention jℓ−dit+1 = k
∗, item 1 holds as following
vib(s)qjs+1 − pjs+1 ≥ vib(s+1)qjs+1 − pjs+1 = vib(s+1)qjs+2 − pjs+2 ≥ · · · ≥ vit−1qk∗ − pk∗ ≥ 0.
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For the second inequality, by pricing rule (c), we know that
pjs
qjs
≥
pjs+1
qjs+1
holds if and only if
vib(s)(qjs − qjs+1) + pjs+1
qjs
≥
pjs+1
qjs+1
which holds if and only if
(vib(s)qjs+1 − pjs+1)(qjs − qjs+1) ≥ 0,
which follows from the first inequality.
The third inequality follows immediately from the second one and the non-increasing ordering of
q’s.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that S is a candidate winner set and T is a subset of items, where |T | = d(S).
Let X be the allocation computed in the procedure MaxRevenue(S, T ). Then MaxRevenue(S, T )
determines whether there exists a price vector p such that (p,X) is an envy-free solution, and if the
answer is ‘yes’, it outputs one that maximizes the total revenue given by allocation X.
Proof. Assume that there is a price vector p′ such that (p′,X) is a revenue maximizing envy-free
solution, with the winner set S and the sold item set T . In one direction, we prove that the algorithm
given the input sets S and T returns a solution with at least the same total revenue. On another
direction, we prove that the solution found by the Algorithm is an envy-free solution for the fixed
sets S and T . By Remark 4.1, this sharp envy-free solution must be an optimal one. The two parts
together complete the proof.
For the first direction, let S = {i1, i2, . . . , it} with vi1 ≥ vi2 ≥ · · · ≥ vit and T = {j1, j2, . . . , jℓ}
with qj1 ≥ qj2 ≥ · · · ≥ qjℓ. By Claim 4.1,
∑
j∈Xit
(vitqj − p
′
j) = 0. Consider an item k
′ =
argmaxk∈Xit (vit−1qk − p
′
k). Define a new price vector p as follows:
• For j ∈ Xit , pj = p
′
j .
• For j ∈ Xit−1 , pj = vit−1(qj − qk′) + p
′
k′ .
• For j ∈ Xi1 ∪ · · · ∪Xit−2 , pj is defined according to step (c) of the procedure MaxRevenue.
It is easy to see that the formulas (1), (2) and (3) of LP(k
′) are satisfied for price vector p. By induction
on the reverse order of items, we can show that p′ ≤ p (First, we know, by envy-freeness, vit−1qj−pj ≥
vit−1qk − p
′
k, for any k ∈ Xit and j ∈ Xit−1 , which implies pj ≤ vit−1qj − maxk∈Xit (vit−1qk − p
′
k) =
vit−1(qj − qk′) + p
′
k′ . Hence, p
′
j ≤ pj, for any j ∈ Xit−1 . Similarly, by induction, pj defined according
to step (c) of the procedure MaxRevenue is the maximum price that item j can be defined as.
Thus, p′ ≤ p). This implies that formula (4) of LPk′ is satisfied as well. Further, since prices are
monotonically increasing, all losers (in particular, those in LS) are still sharp envy-free, which implies
formula (5) is satisfied. Formula (6) is automatically satisfied. Hence, p is a feasible solution of LP(k
′).
Hence, there is a feasible solution in the above procedure MaxRevenue(S, T ) for item k′; this implies
that Y 6= ∅ in the course of the procedure.
In addition, again because of p′ ≤ p, the total revenue generated by (p,X) is at least that by
(p′,X). By the objective of the linear program, we know that the revenue generated by the solution
at LP(k
′) is at least that given by (p,X) Therefore, by Remark 4.1, MaxRevenue(S, T ) computes a
revenue no less than that of (p,X).
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For the second direction, let (p,X) be the output of the procedure MaxRevenue(S, T ). We need
to show that (p,X) is an envy-free solution. Suppose (p,X) is computed in terms of LP(k
∗), where
k∗ ∈ Xit .
We first claim that all losers are sharp envy-free. By Proposition 4.3, we need only to check if all
the losers in LS are sharp envy-free for (p,X). Since pj = ∞, ∀j /∈ T , we only need to check that all
the losers in LS would not envy the items in T .
According to (5) in step (a) ofMaxRevenue(S, T ), for any i ∈ LS, we know that
∑
j∈T ′(viqj−pj) ≤
0 for any T ′ ⊆ J with |T ′| = di. Choose T
′ = {jℓ−dit−di+1, jℓ−dit−di+2, · · · , jℓ−dit} ⊆ J (as di ≤ ∆).
Let jmax be the largest index in T
′ such that viqjmax − pjmax ≤ 0. Then, by monotonicity of price-per-
unit-quality in Proposition 4.5, we have
qj1
(
vi −
pj1
qj1
)
≤ qj2
(
vi −
pj2
qj2
)
≤ · · · ≤ qjmax
(
vi −
pjmax
qjmax
)
≤ 0,
and viqj − pj > 0, ∀j ∈ {jmax+1, jmax+2, . . . , jℓ−dit}.
Hence, for every loser i in LS , its largest di values in the set {viqj − pj | j ∈ T} are contained in{
viqj − pj | j ∈ {jℓ−dit−di+1, jℓ−dit−di+2, . . . , jℓ} ⊂ J
}
. Therefore, the requirement (5) in step (a) of
MaxRevenue(S, T ) would imply that for any T ′ ⊂ T with |T ′| = di, we have
∑
j∈T ′(viqj − pj) ≤ 0,
which means that i is sharp envy-free. Hence, all the losers are sharp envy-free for the tuple.
It remains to show that all winners are sharp envy-free as well. Before doing this, by the pricing
rule in subroutine (c), we can easily see that for any iu and j ∈ Xiu with u < t, there exists item
j′ ∈ Xiu+1 such that pj = viu(qj − qj′) + pj′ . We will use this particular property to show that all
winners are sharp envy-free. Since pj = ∞ for any j /∈ T , it suffices to show that any winner would
not envy the items of other winners. The claim follows from the following arguments.
• All winners get non-negative utility. Formula (2) guarantees that it gets non-negative utility for
Xit . For any winner iu < it, none has over-priced item. It follows by the fact that, ∀s ∈ J −Xit ,
pjs = vib(s)(qjs − qjs+1) + pjs+1 in the algorithm and vib(s)qjs+1 − pjs+1 ≥ 0 in Proposition 4.5.
• Buyer it would not envy items won by any other winner iu, where iu < it. We show this by
induction. Formula (4) shows the base case holds (i.e., it would not envy items won by it−1).
Then, for any item j′ ∈ Xit and any item j ∈ Xiu , (notice that by the pricing rule, there exists
k ∈ Xiu+1 such that pj = viu(qj − qk) + pk), we have
vitqj − pj = vitqj − (viu(qj − qk) + pk) = (vit − viu)(qj − qk) + vitqk − pk
≤ vitqk − pk ≤ vitqj′ − pj′ ,
where the first inequality follows from vit − viu ≤ 0 and qj − qk ≥ 0, and the second inequality
follows from the induction hypothesis.
• For any iu, iu < it, iu would not envy items won by it. Again, the proof is by induction. For the
base case iu = it−1, for any item j ∈ Xit−1 and item j
′ ∈ Xit , it holds that
vit−1qj − pj = vit−1qj − (vit−1(qj − qk∗) + pk∗) = vit−1qk∗ − pk∗ ≥ vit−1qj′ − pj′,
where the first equality follows from formula (3) and the inequality follows from formula (1).
Hence, the base case holds. Next for any j ∈ Xiu and item j
′ ∈ Xit , (notice by pricing rule, there
exists k ∈ Xiu+1 such that pj = viu(qj − qk) + pk), we have
viuqj − pj = viuqj − (viu(qj − qk) + pk) = viuqk − pk
= (viu − viu+1)(qk − qj′) + viuqj′ + (viu+1(qk − qj′)− pk).
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Since viu−viu+1 ≥ 0 and qk−qj′ ≥ 0, and by the induction hypothesis, viu+1qk−pk ≥ viu+1qj′−pj′,
it holds that viuqj − pj ≥ viuqj′ − pj′ .
• Every winner in S\{it} would not envy the items won by other winner in S\{it}. Use the
convention jℓ−dit+1 = k
∗, recall ∀u, 1 ≤ u ≤ ℓ − dit , pju = vib(u)(qju − qju+1) + pju+1, then for
1 ≤ s < s′ ≤ ℓ− dit ,
pjs − pjs′ =
s′−1∑
u=s
(pju − pju+1) =
s′−1∑
u=s
vib(u)(qju − qju+1)
≤ vib(s)
s′−1∑
u=s
(qju − qju+1) = vib(s)(qjs − qjs′ ).
Rewrite pjs − pjs′ ≤ vib(s)(qjs − qjs′ ) as vib(s)qjs − pjs ≥ vib(s)qjs′ − pjs′ , which means buyer with
smaller index would not envy items won by buyer with larger index. Similarly, note that
pjs − pjs′ =
s′−1∑
u=s
vib(u)(qju − qju+1) ≥ vib(s′)
s′−1∑
u=s
(qju − qju+1) = vib(s′)(qjs − qjs′ ).
Rewrite pjs − pjs′ ≥ vib(s′)(qjs − qjs′ ) as vib(s′)qjs − pjs ≤ vib(s′)qjs′ − pjs′ , which means buyer with
larger index would not envy items won by buyer with smaller index. In all, every winner in
S\{it} would not envy the items won by other winner in S\{it}.
Therefore, we know that the tuple (p,X) is an envy-free solution.
Observe that the computation of step (a) of MaxRevenue does not depend on the whole set
T . In fact, we only need to know the last 2∆ items with largest indices in T to check whether Y is
empty or not. Therefore, whether MaxRevenue(S, T ) will output a tuple only depends on the last
2∆ items in T . The prices for those 2∆ items are determined in one of the linear programs there.
Suppose that the last 2∆ items in T are J and let jmin = min{j ∈ J}, then if MaxRevenue(S, T )
output a tuple (p,X), we can re-choose any other set Z ⊆ {1, 2, 3, . . . , jmin − 1} with |Z| = ℓ − 2∆
and run MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪ J), which would always output an envy-free tuple (p′,X′) as well.
Similarly, if MaxRevenue(S, T ) claims that there is no tuple (p,X) which is an envy-free solution,
then MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪ J) also claims that no tuple exists. These observations are critical in our
main algorithm Max-EF.
4.1.5 Only the Winner Set is Known
Suppose that we are given a candidate winner set S = {i1, i2, . . . , it} and a set of items J = {j1, . . . , j2∆}
with i1 < i2 < · · · < it and j1 < · · · < j2∆. Assume that ℓ = d(S) > 2∆. Let Y = {1, 2, . . . , j1 − 1}
denote the set of items that have indices smaller than j1. Our objective is to pick a subset Z ⊆ Y with
|Z| = ℓ−2∆ such that the revenue given byMaxRevenue(S,Z∪J) is as large as possible. By steps (a)
and (c) of MaxRevenue, for the given set of winners S, the prices of the items in J are already fixed
(no matter which Z is chosen). Hence, to maximize revenue from MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪ J), it suffices
to maximize revenue (or equivalently, prices) from the items in Z. To this end, we use the approach
of dynamic programming to find an optimal solution.
Consider any subset Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zℓ−2∆} ⊆ Y with z1 < z2 < · · · < zℓ−2∆; denote zℓ−2∆+1 = j1.
Suppose MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪J) will output a tuple (p,X). As we already know the winner to which
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each zj will be allocated by MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪ J), let wj = vi if zj ∈ Xi, for j = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ − 2∆;
further, let w0 = 0. An important observation is that the values of all wj’s are independent to the
selection of Z. By the pricing rule inMaxRevenue(S,Z∪J), it holds that pzj = wj(qzj−qzj+1)+pzj+1 ,
for j = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ− 2∆. Hence, we have
ℓ−2∆∑
j=1
pzj =
ℓ−2∆∑
j=1

ℓ−2∆∑
u=j
(pzu − pzu+1) + pj1


=
ℓ−2∆∑
j=1
ℓ−2∆∑
u=j
(
(qzu − qzu+1)wu
)
+ (ℓ− 2∆)pj1
=
ℓ−2∆∑
j=1
(j · qzjwj − j · qzj+1wj) + (ℓ− 2∆)pj1
=
[
ℓ−2∆∑
j=1
(
j · wj − (j − 1) · wj−1
)
qzj
]
−
[
(ℓ− 2∆)(qj1wℓ−2∆ − pj1)
]
, R1 −R2,
where R1 and R2 are the first and second term of the difference, respectively. By the rule of MaxRev-
enue, the allocation of zℓ−2∆ (thus, the value wℓ−2∆) and the price pj1 are fixed. Hence, to maximize
ℓ−2∆∑
j=1
pzj , it suffices to maximize R1. For any α, β with 1 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ j1 − 1, let opt(α, β) denote the
optimal value of the following problem, denoted by DLP (α, β), which picks α items from the first β
items to maximize a given objective (recall that wj is defined above for j = 1, . . . , ℓ− 2∆).
max
α∑
j=1
(
j · wj − (j − 1) · wj−1
)
qzj
s.t. z1 < z2 < · · · < zα, {z1, z2, . . . , zα} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , β}.
The problem that maximizes R1 is exactly DLP (ℓ− 2∆, j1 − 1), which can be solved by the following
dynamic programming.
Solve-DLP
1. Compute opt(1, 1), opt(1, 2), . . . , opt(1, j1 − 1).
2. Compute
opt(α, β+1) =
{
max
{
opt(α, β), opt(α − 1, β) + (α · wα − (α− 1)wα−1)qβ+1
}
if β + 1 ≥ α
0 Otherwise
3. Find a subset Z∗ that maximizes opt(ℓ− 2∆, j1 − 1).
4. Return the output of MaxRevenue(S,Z∗ ∪ J).
The following claim is straightforward from the definition of DLP (α, β) and the above dynamic
programming.
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Proposition 4.6. Given a candidate winner set S and a subset J of 2∆ items, the above Solve-
DLP picks in polynomial time a subset Z ⊆ Y with |Z| = ℓ − 2∆ such that the revenue given by
MaxRevenue(S,Z ∪ J) is the maximum if we guessed S and J correctly.
4.1.6 Algorithm
In this subsection, we will present our main algorithmMax-EF. The algorithm has two stages: stage 1
is to select the set of possible winners (candidate winners), and stage 2 is designed to calculate all
the ‘candidate’ maximum revenue and output an optimal envy-free solution and maximum revenue.
The algorithm is described as follows.
Max-EF stage 1.
1. Initialize D = ∅ (denote the collection of candidate winner sets).
2. Find S ⊆ A1 such that d(S) = max
{
d(S′) | d(S′) ≤ m,S′ ⊆ A1
}
, let D ← {S}.
3. For k = 2, . . . ,K
• For each d such that 1 ≤ d ≤ m
– Let S = argmaxS{d(S)|d(S) ≤ d, S ⊂ Ak}.
– Let S0,1 = S, n0 = 1 and C0 = {S0,1}.
– Let ℓ = |A1 ∪A2 ∪ · · · ∪ Ak−1|.
– For t = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ do:
∗ In general, we have constructed Ct containing all the candidate
winner sets of {ℓ− t+ 1, ℓ− t+ 2, . . . , ℓ} ∪ S.
∗ We order Ct = {St,1, St,2, . . . , St,nt} such that d(St,1) ≤ d(St,2) ≤ · · · ≤
d(St,nt) ≤ m.
∗ We now add ℓ− t into Ct to construct Ct+1.
· Let ts = max{i : d(St,i) < dℓ−t} if {i : d(St,i) < dℓ−t} 6= ∅, otherwise
ts = 0.
· Let St+1,j = St,j for j = 1, 2, · · · , ts.
· Let St+1,j+ts = St,j ∪ {ℓ− t} for j = 1, 2, . . . , nt.
· Let nt+1 = max{i ≤ ts + nt : d(St+1,i) ≤ m}.
· Let Ct+1 = {St+1,i : i ≤ nt+1, d(St+1,i) ≤ m}.
– D ← D ∪ Cℓ.
4. return D
stage 1 of Max-EF is designed to select candidate winner sets one of which contains exactly the
winners in an optimal envy-free solution. For each 1 ≤ k ≤ K ≤ n and 1 ≤ d ≤ m the problem is of
one discussed in Lemma 4.1. It constructs C, consisting of up to m
d
subsets of total size O(mn
d
) in time
O(mn
2
d
). The total time complexity then adds up to O(mn3 logm). Hence, Max-EF runs in strongly
polynomial time.
Proposition 4.7. There is an optimal winner set contained in the set D.
Proof. Now suppose there is an optimal winner set W , if W ⊆ A1, then by Proposition 4.4, the set S
selected in above algorithm is an optimal winner set and we are done. Otherwise, let imax = max(W );
suppose imax ∈ Ak∗ , where k
∗ ≥ 2, and let w∗ = d(W ∩ Ak∗). Now consider the k
∗th and w∗th
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round of the for loop. There exists T ⊆ Ak∗ such that d(T ) = w
∗. By Proposition 4.4, we know that
(W\(W ∩ Ak)) ∪ T is an optimal winner set. By the procedure of the algorithm and Proposition 4.2
and the proof of Lemma 4.1, the algorithm would find all the candidate winner sets with the form
C ∪ T where C ⊆ A1 ∪ · · · ∪Ak−1. Hence, (W\(W ∩Ak)) ∪ T ∈ D.
Max-EF stage 2.
5. For each candidate winner set S ∈ D
• Let ℓ = d(S)
• If ℓ ≤ 2∆
– For any set J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with |J | = ℓ
∗ Run MaxRevenue(S, J).
∗ If it outputs a tuple (p,X), let RS,J ←
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Xi
pj
∗ Else, let RS,J ← 0.
• Else ℓ > 2∆
– For any set J ⊆ {ℓ− 2∆+ 1, ℓ− 2∆+ 2, . . . ,m} with |J | = 2∆
∗ Let jmin ← min{j ∈ J}
∗ Choose any Z ← {z1, . . . , zℓ−2∆} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , jmin − 1}, where z1 > z2 > · · · >
zℓ−2∆.
∗ Run MaxRevenue(S, J ∪ Z)
∗ If it outputs a tuple
· run Solve-DLP on S and J to get a tuple (p,X)
· let RS,J ←
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Xi
pj
∗ Else, let RS,J ← 0
6. Output a tuple (p,X) which gives the maximum RS,J.
Since MaxRevenue and Solve-DLP takes polynomial time, and |D| ≤ nm logm, we know stage 2
of Max-EF runs in polynomial time.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Since Max-EF takes polynomial time, we only need to check that Max-EF
will output an optimal envy-free solution. By the above analysis, we know thatMax-EF will output an
envy-free solution. Since there is an optimal winner S ∈ D, there exists an optimal envy-free solution
(p,X) such that S = {i|Xi 6= ∅}. W.l.o.g. suppose that the items in T =
⋃n
i=1Xi are allocated to
S by the rules of allocation of MaxRevenue(S, T ) (otherwise, there exists i > i′ and j < j′ such
that j ∈ Xi and j
′ ∈ Xi′ , if vi = vi′ , then viqj − pj ≥ viqj′ − pj′ and vi′qj − pj ≤ vi′qj′ − pj′ , hence
viqj −pj = viqj′−pj′ , then exchanging the allocation j and j
′ without changing their prices would still
make everyone envy-free. If vi < vi′ , then by Lemma 2.3, we have qj = qj′, then exchanging allocation
j and j′ and their prices would still make everyone envy-free). If d(S) ≤ 2∆, then by the argument of
Lemma 4.2, we know RS,T ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Xi
pj. Similarly if d(S) > 2∆, let J be the 2∆ largest values in T ,
by the argument of Lemma 4.2 and Proposition 4.6, we know RS,J ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Xi
pj. Therefore, the output
(p,X) of Max-EF is an optimal envy-free solution.
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4.2 Proof of Hardness
We next prove the NP-hardness result that is part of Theorem 4.1, that envy-free revenue maximization
with viqj valuations is NP-hard.
We reduce from the exact cover by 3-sets problem (X3C): Given a ground set A = {a1, a2, . . . , a3n}
and collection T = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} where each Si ⊂ A and |Si| = 3, we are asked if there are n
elements of T that cover all elements in A. We assume that n ≤ m ≤ 2n− 1; it is easy to see that the
problem still remains NP-complete (as we can add dummy elements x, y, z to A and subsets including
either x, y or z to T to balance the sizes of A and T ).
Given an instance of X3C, we construct a market with 3 buyers and n +m items as follows. Let
M = 3nm+1, L =
∑3n
i=1M
i. Note that L < 3nM3n, whose binary representation is of size polynomial
in m and n. Consider m values Ri =
∑
aj∈Si
M j , for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and rearranging if necessary, let
R1 ≥ R2 ≥ · · · ≥ Rm be a non-increasing order of these values. The valuations and demands of buyers
are
d1 = n, v1 = 3
d2 = 2n, v2 =
3n + 1
n+ 1
d3 = n, v3 = 2
The qualities of items are defined as follows: Let qj = L, for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and qn+j = Rj , for j =
1, 2, . . . ,m. Obviously, the unit values and qualities are in non-increasing order, and the construction
is polynomial.
Consider the winner set in an optimal envy-free solution (p,X). Since n ≤ m ≤ 2n − 1, the
possible winner sets are {1}, {2}, {3}, and {1, 3}. There is no envy-free solution where {2} or {3}
is the winner set, since buyer 1 would be envious. It remains to consider {1} and {1, 3}. If the
winner set is {1}, then the optimal revenue is v1 ·
(∑n
i=1 qi
)
= 3nL where buyer 1 gets the first n
items. If the winner set is {1, 3}, it is not difficult to see that in the optimal envy-free solution (p,X),
it holds that X1 = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Suppose that X3 = {j1, j2, . . . , jn} ⊂ {n + 1, n + 2, . . . , n + m}
where j1 > j2 > · · · > jn. Applying the characterizations of optimal envy-freeness i.e. procedure
of MaxRevenue(S, T ), and Lemma 4.2 in Section 4.1.4, we will prove the following claim. In the
optimal solution (p,X) with X1 = {1, 2, . . . , n} and X3 = {j1, j2, . . . , jn},
Claim 4.2.
v1qk − pk = v1qj − pj ∀k, j ∈ X3
proof of Claim 4.2. According to MaxRevenue(S, T ), there exists k∗ : n+1 ≤ k∗ ≤ m+ n such that
(p,X) is the optimal solution of the following linear program(denoted by LP (k
∗)).
min v1qk∗ − pk∗
s.t. v1qk∗ − pk∗ ≥ v1qj − pj ∀ j ∈ X3 (1
∗)∑
j∈X3
(v3qj − pj) = 0 (2
∗)
v1qj − pj = v1qk∗ − pk∗ ∀ j ∈ X1 (3
∗)
v3qj − pj ≤ v3qj′ − pj′ ∀ j ∈ X1, j
′ ∈ X3 (4
∗)∑
j∈X1∪X3
(v2qj − pj) ≤ 0 (5
∗)
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Please note that the last set of equations (6∗) in the original LP are not needed since they are empty
under the current restriction of three buyers. We first prove all the inequalities in (1∗) must be
equalities. Suppose it is not true. Then there exists ℓ ∈ X3 such that
v1qk∗ − pk∗ > v1qℓ − pℓ.
Set aj = v1qj − pj, j ∈ X3. From (2
∗), it follows that
∑
j∈X3
aj = (v1 − v3)
∑
j∈X3
qj . Take the average
a¯ =
∑
j∈X3
aj
|X3|
=
(v1 − v3)
∑
j∈X3
qj
|X3|
We introduce the price vector p′ = (p′1, p
′
2, · · · , p
′
n, p
′
j1
, p′j2 , · · · , p
′
jn
) such that ∀j ∈ X3: p
′
j = v1qj − a¯
and ∀j ∈ X1: p
′
j = v1(qj − qk∗) + p
′
k∗. If we can prove that (p
′,X) is still a feasible solution for LP k
∗
,
then p′k∗ > pk∗ (due to ak∗ > a¯ by (1
∗)). It results in a smaller objective value than v1qk∗ − pk∗, a
contradiction to the optimality of (p,X).
First, (1∗) (2∗) (3∗) follows directly from definition of p′. We need only to check (4∗) and (5∗).
From p′k∗ > pk∗, ∀ j ∈ X1 p
′
j = v1(qj − qk∗)+ p
′
k∗ > v1(qj − qk∗)+ pk∗ = pj . We have ∀j ∈ X1: p
′
j > pj.
Hence, the inequality (5∗) holds. To see inequality (4∗), notice
v3qj − p
′
j = v3qj − v1(qj − qk∗)− p
′
k∗
= v3qj − v1(qj − qj′)− p
′
j′
= (v3 − v1)(qj − qj′) + v3qj′ − p
′
j′
≤ v3qj′ − p
′
j′, ∀j ∈ X1, j
′ ∈ X3.
Claim 4.2 is proven.
By Claim 4.2 and the above condition (3∗), we have
v1qi − pi = v1qj − pj, ∀ i ∈ X1, j ∈ X3 (1)
By the above condition (2∗), ∑
j∈X3
pj = v3 ·
n∑
k=1
qjk . (2)
Combining (1) and (2), the total revenue is
R =
n∑
i=1
pi +
∑
j∈X3
pj = v1 ·
n∑
i=1
qi + (2v3 − v1) ·
n∑
k=1
qjk .
Since buyer 2 is envy-free, we have
v2 ·
( n∑
i=1
qi +
n∑
k=1
qjk
)
−R = (v2 − v1) ·
n∑
i=1
qi + (v1 + v2 − 2v3) ·
n∑
k=1
qjk ≤ 0.
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Therefore, computing the maximum revenue when the winner set is {1, 3} is equivalent to solving the
following program:
max R = v1 ·
n∑
i=1
qi + (2v3 − v1) ·
n∑
k=1
qjk
s.t. (v2 − v1) ·
n∑
i=1
qi + (v1 + v2 − 2v3) ·
n∑
k=1
qjk ≤ 0
j1 > j2 > · · · > jn, jk ∈ {n + 1, n + 2, . . . , n+m}, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(3)
Considering v1 = 3, v2 =
3n+1
n+1 , v3 = 2, and qi = L, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, the program (3) is equivalent to
max R = 3nL+
n∑
k=1
qjk
s.t.
n∑
k=1
qjk ≤ L
j1 > j2 > · · · > jn, jk ∈ {n + 1, n + 2, . . . , n+m}, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
(4)
It is not difficult to see that the maximum revenue (i.e., the optimal value of the above program) is
(3n+ 1)L if and only if there is a positive answer to the instance of X3C. This completes the proof.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, multi-unit demand models of the matching market are studied and their competitive
equilibrium solutions and envy-free solutions are considered. For the sharp demand model, a strongly
polynomial time algorithm is presented to decide whether a competitive equilibrium exists or not and
if one exists, to compute one that maximizes the revenue. In contrast, the revenue maximization
problem for envy-free solutions is shown to be NP-hard. In a special case when the sharp demands of
all players are bounded by a constant, a polynomial time algorithm is provide to solve the (envy-free)
revenue maximization problem if the demand of each buyer is bounded by a constant number.
The sharp demand model is related to interesting applications such as sponsored search market
for rich media ad pricing. Our work serves a modest step toward an efficient algorithmic solution.
Our models may be further investigated to deal with much more complicated settings of application
problems.
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A Hardness for General Valuations
Theorem A.1. It is NP-complete to determine the existence of a competitive equilibrium for general
valuations in the sharp demand model (even when all demands are 3, and valuations are 0/1).
Proof. We reduce from exact cover by 3-sets (X3C): Given a ground set A = {a1, . . . , a3n} and a
collection of subsets S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ A where |Si| = 3 for each i, we are asked whether there are n
subsets that cover all elements in A. Given an instance of X3C, we construct a market with 3n + 3
items and 9n + m + 1 buyers as follows. Every element in A corresponds to an item; further, we
introduce another three items B = {b1, b2, b3}. We use index j to denote one item. For each subset Si,
there is a buyer with value vij = 1 if j ∈ Si and vij = 0 otherwise; further, for every possible subset
{x, y, z} where x ∈ A and y, z ∈ B, there is a buyer with value vij = 1 if j ∈ {x, y, z} and vij = 0
otherwise; finally, there is a buyer with value vij = 1 if j ∈ B and vij = 0 otherwise. The demand of
every buyer is 3.
We claim that there is a positive answer to the X3C instance if and only if there is a competitive
equilibrium in the constructed market. Assume that there is T ∈ {S1, . . . , Sm} with |T | = n that
covers all elements in A. Then we allocate items in A to the buyers in T and allocate B to the buyer
who desires B, and set all prices to be 1. It can be seen that this defines a competitive equilibrium.
On the other hand, assume that there is a competitive equilibrium (p,X). We first claim that all
the items in B must be allocated (Cl). Suppose the claim C1 is not true, there are two cases: Case 1,
there is only one unallocated items, since if the items in B are allocated, either two items are allocated
to some buyer or all three items are allocated (because there only exist buyers who desire two items in
B or three items in B). W.l.o.g. suppose b1 and b2 together with some x ∈ A are allocated to a buyer
and b3 is unallocated, then we know pb1 + pb2 + px ≤ 3. If px = 3, it holds that pb1 = pb2 = 0, then
buyer who values B will not be envy-free. If px < 3, then we either have pb1 + px < 3 or pb2 + px < 3.
W.l.o.g. suppose pb1 + px < 3, then the buyer who values the set {b1, x, b3} will not be envy-free. Case
2: all three items in B would be unallocated, contradicting envy-freeness of the buyer who values B.
Second, we claim all the items are allocated (C2). Otherwise, by C1, there must exist an item aj ∈ A
that is not allocated to any buyer. Then we have paj = 0. Consider the buyers who desire subsets
{aj , b1, b2}, {aj , b1, b3}, {aj , b2, b3}. They do not win since aj is not sold. Due to envy-freeness, we have
pb1 + pb2 ≥ 3
pb1 + pb3 ≥ 3
pb2 + pb3 ≥ 3
This implies that pb1 + pb2 + pb3 ≥ 4.5. Hence, the buyer who desires B cannot afford the price of B
and at least one item in B, say b1, is not allocated out, which contradicts with C1.
Now since all items in A are allocated out, because of the construction of the market, we have to
allocate all items in A to n buyers and allocate B to one buyer; the former gives a solution to the X3C
instance.
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